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STRANDED COSTS AND GRID DECARBONIZATION
Emily Hammond* & Jim Rossi**
ABSTRACT
Energy law is well equipped to facilitate the transition to a decarbonized grid. Over the past half
century, energy law has endured many stranded cost experiments, each helping firms and
customers adjust to a new normal. However, these past experiments have contributed to a
myopic regulatory approach to past stranded cost recovery by: (1) endorsing a preference for
addressing all stranded costs only after energy resource investment decisions have been made;
and (2) fixating on the firm’s financial costs and protection of investors, rather than on the
broader impacts of each on the energy system.
The current transition to decarbonization is already giving rise to stranded cost claims related to
existing energy assets like coal-fired and nuclear power plants. New energy infrastructure
investments—such as natural gas pipelines and natural gas-fired power plants--will also face
stranded cost issues once they have provided the expected bridge to a clean energy future.
We see the transition to grid decarbonization as a propitious opportunity for energy law to
improve its approach to stranded cost compensation for investor risks. Unlike with past energy
industry changes, where stranded costs were routinely addressed after investment decisions were
made, it is important for regulators to address stranded costs now, at the outset of the transition
to a decarbonized grid. As in the past, stranded cost compensation will prove important, if not
essential, to this impending energy transition. But it should be approached in a manner that
helps to overcome the obstacles to a decarbonized grid, reassure investors in new infrastructure
without distorting capital signals to favor legacy resources, and recognize important energy
resource attributes that competitive markets fail to price.

INTRODUCTION
Change is at the center of today’s debates regarding how to transition to a lowcarbon energy infrastructure. Achieving an 80% reduction from 1990 carbon emission
levels by the year 20501 will require increased renewables penetration,2 near-term

*
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1
This is roughly the level of emissions reduction necessary to meet the commonly agreed upon goal in the
international community of limiting anthropogenic increase in global mean surface temperatures to less
than 2 degrees Celsius. See PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES xi (November
2014), at http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/US-Deep-Decarbonization-Report.pdf [hereinafter
“PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION”].
2
Nat’l Renewable Energy Laboraty, Renewable Electricity Futures Study (2012), Executive Summary, at
30 (estimating electricity demand could be met by 80% renewable sources by 2050), at
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/52409-ES.pdf.
**
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reliance on significant amounts of new natural gas power generation,3 a potential major
transition away from traditional base load power plants,4 significant investment in
distributed generation and new technologies,5 and increased focus on demand-side
measures.6 But given the industry’s stationary capital assets with financial and
operational lives ranging from 50-80 years in length, energy infrastructure can change
only at a slow pace. Path dependency threatens “carbon lock-in,” which could thwart any
successful transition to a low carbon energy system.7 To the extent that grid
decarbonization adversely affects the economic value of a significant portion of current
assets (such as older coal plants), some industry investors and analysts have even raised
concerns that the impending disruptions of change could lead to financial distress,
hardship and, at the extreme, catastrophe.8

3

Cf. Steve Weissman, Natural Gas as a Bridge Fuel: Measuring the Bridge, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY 1 (Mar. 2016) (noting near-term need but cautioning against long-term natural gas reliance).
4
See LUCY JOHNSTON & RACHEL WILSON, STRATEGIES FOR DECARBONIZING THE ELECTRIC POWER
SUPPLY 6-7 (Regulatory Assistance Project 2012), online at
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=9&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUK
Ewjk6fMv6jNAhVPc1IKHUawDPUQFghTMAg&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.raponline.org%2Fdocument%2Fd
ownload%2Fid%2F259&usg=AFQjCNGKA2nczeApiKKNrN-HxCF31v_7XA&sig2=W1gP7C5Z_mfvQpxFYXBVw&bvm=bv.124272578,d.aXo (noting that more than 70 percent of U.S. coal-fired
capacity is more than 30 years old).
5
See, e.g., Amy L. Stein, Distributed Reliability, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 887 (2016) (considering regulatory
needs for incorporating distributed generation into grid reliability policymaking); Amy L. Stein,
Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy Storage, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697
(2014) (considering regulatory needs for emerging technologies like energy storage).
6
See PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION, supra note 1.
7
As Gregory Unruh describes:
. . . . industrial economies have been locked into fossil-fuel based energy systems through a
process of technological and institutional co-evolution driven by path-dependent increasing
returns to scale. It is asserted that this condition, termed carbon lock-in, creatsed persistent market
and policy failure that can inhibit the diffusion of carbon-saving technologies despite their
apparent environmental and economic advantages.
Gregory Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-In, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 817, 817 (2000).
8
See, e.g., Elisabeth Grarry & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition Mean a Death Spiral for
Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 2 (2014); DELOITTE, THE NEW MATH: SOLVING THE EQUATION FOR
DISRUPTION TO THE U.S. ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR (2013), at
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/energy-resources/us-energyandresourcesthe-new-math.pdf; EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND
STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS (January 2013),2013), at
http://www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf. See also Alex Morales,
“Stranded Assets:” Will Efforts to Counter Warming Render Energy Reserves Worthless?, WASHINGTON
POST, Dec. 5, 2014, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/stranded-assets-will-efforts-to-counterwarming-render-energy-reserves-worthless/2014/12/05/ecbc73a6-7a45-11e4-9a276fdbc612bff8_story.html (describing a similar threat to the fossil fuel industry more generally). To
underscore the significant of stranding impacts of the impending transition, one study envisions that the
global stranded cost impact of the impending transition is in the range of $25 trillion for the entire energy
sector. See DAVID NELSON, ET AL., MOVING TO LOW-CARBON ECONOMY: THE IMPACT OF POLICY
PATHWAYS ON FOSSIL FUEL; ASSET VALUES iv (Climate Policy Initative 2014), at
http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Moving-to-a-Low-Carbon-Economy-TheImpacts-of-Policy-Pathways-on-Fossil-Fuel-Asset-Values.pdf.
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Energy law can deal with such change. On many occasions over the past half
century, energy law has been required to confront the “stranded costs” of transitions—
that is, the value of a regulated firm’s investments left shipwrecked by changing
regulatory circumstances. From an accounting standpoint, stranded costs are defined as
the difference between an asset’s book value—including such things as power generating
equipment—and its market value.9 From a regulatory compact standpoint (discussed in
more detail momentarily), stranded costs are those investments that a utility has incurred
to meet its obligations to serve customers with an expectation of cost recovery through
rates, but which may no longer be recoverable due to a change in the rules or new market
competition in the industry.10 Our initial working definition of stranded costs is simple:
We focus on existing energy infrastructure that retains some useful life but that can no
longer generate initially expected revenue due to regulatory shifts, market forces, or
innovation. But as we also discuss, in the transition to decarbonization the stranded cost
issue will be just as significant for new investments in energy resources as it is for
existing infrastructure.
This Article maintains that the traditional approach energy regulators have used to
compensate stranded costs for existing resources during industry transitions has suffered
from myopia and must be reformed to address the transition to decarbonization. The
traditional notion of stranded costs is embedded in an understanding of regulation known
as the “regulatory compact (or contract),”11 where the utility takes on an obligation to
serve customers and, in return, is guaranteed an opportunity to recover the costs of its
investments. This approach worked for decades to provide some degree of certainty to
investors, though its flaws are also well known.12 In addressing new stranded cost
challenges and opportunities, energy law can best facilitate a balance between promoting
investor certainty and providing flexibility by being proactive, recognizing that past
approaches to stranded cost recovery could just as easily thwart as facilitate
decarbonization.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I argues that stranded cost recovery
mechanisms over the past 50 years have fixated on honoring the “deal” of the regulatory
contract for incumbent firms and their investors. Furthermore, regulators have seriously
grappled with transition costs issues only after a change in conditions has occurred. Each
time a new energy transition takes place, energy regulators have provided for significant
stranded cost compensation, though it is not always clear that the manner in which they
did so provided sound investment signals for the energy system. Moreover, stranded cost
9

Charles Stalon, Stranded Investment Costs: Desirable and Less Desirable Solutions, in Proceedings: What
are the Transition Costs to a More Competitive Market and Who Should Pay?, at 2 (June 15, 1994).
10
William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Stranded Costs, 18 HARV. J. L. & PUB. Pol’y 835, 835 (1995).
11
See Jersey Century Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., conc.)
(referencing the term).
12
Particularly salient examples include the numerous canceled nuclear and coal-fired power plants in the
1980s and the major shifts associated with moving to competitive electricity markets. See, e.g., John
Burrett McArthur, Cost Responsibility or Regulatory Indulgence for Electricity’s Stranded Costs?, 47 AM.
U. L. REV. 775 (1998) (electricity restructuring); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in
Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1984) (coal and nuclear). See
infra at Part I.A for further discussion.
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recovery has often stood in the way of change, failing to sufficiently address the
“stranded benefits” of new transitions13 or the broader social values advanced by industry
transitions. In large part this has happened because stranded cost recovery has been
addressed only ex post, when a fixation on losses to a firm’s existing investments drives
the discussion. We maintain that this stranded cost myopia has distorted some basic
investments signals, magnified an excess capacity problem with some base load power
generation facilities, thwarted new entrants, and prolonged the energy sector’s
dependency on existing energy infrastructure, including many fossil fuel plants.
Part II turns to the energy sector’s transition to decarbonization. The transition to
a new, low-carbon normal challenges every part of this sector, including resource
extraction, power generation, transmission, and distribution. Given regulators’ past
appetite for stranded cost compensation, we can expect incumbent firms to raise new
calls for stranded cost compensation each time a new change is proposed.14 Even now,
several coal companies have already filed for bankruptcy, some nuclear power plants are
at risk for early closure, and local utilities are fighting rooftop solar incentives such as net
metering.15 At the same time, policymakers and industry representatives often speak of
natural gas, and increasingly, nuclear power, as bridge fuels that will facilitate the
transition to a low carbon future.16 The simple reality is that energy regulation is not
particularly adept at “temporary”—and once approved, incumbent firms expect their
assets to stay in operation and produce revenue as long as they can convince regulators to
allow it. At the very minimum, if left unaddressed these stranded cost issues threaten to
delay the transition to decarbonization.
As discussed in Part III, the transition to decarbonization requires regulators to
address stranded costs, though to avoid carbon lock-in they must apply similar principles
to both new and old energy infrastructure. Even so, as Part III also discusses, this does
not necessarily mean the end of stranded cost recovery with a transition towards
decarbonization. Rather, we expect stranded cost issues to be as important as ever.
Investors will continue to seek some commitment from the regulatory process before

“Stranded benefits,” arethose offsetting benefits that transitions can create for firms in an industry
or their investors. See infra, Part I.B.2.
14 See, e.g., Jim Chen, The Nature of the Public Utility: Infrastructure, the Market, and the Law, 98 NW. U.
L. REV. 1617, 1700 (2004) (reviewing GOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE:
MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS, AND DISCRETION (2003)); William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pig in the
Python: Is Lumpy Capacity Investment Used and Useful?, 23 ENERGY L.J. 383 (2002).
15
See Richard Martin, Battles Over Net Metering Cloud the Future of Rooftop Solar, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan.
5, 2016), at https://www.technologyreview.com/s/545146/battles-over-net-metering-cloud-the-future-ofrooftop-solar/ (describing several such challenges).
16
Weissman, supra note 3, at 1; see also N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting A Clean Energy
Standard, Nos. 15-E-0302 & 16-E-0270, at 1 (Aug. 1, 2016) (listing among purposes of new clean energy
standard “to preserve existing zero-emissions nuclear generation resources as a bridge to the clean energy
future”). New York has approved a Clean Energy Standard, that, among other things, seeks to maintain its
nuclear fleet as the state transitions to a low-carbon future, in which it aims for 50% non-emitting
electricity by 2050. See Denis Grab & Burcin Unel, New York’s Clean Energy Standard Is a Key Step
Toward Pricing Carbon Fairly, UTILITY DIVE, Aug. 18, 2016, at http://www.utilitydive.com/news/newyorks-clean-energy-standard-is-a-key-step-toward-pricing-carbon-pollut/424741/.
13
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moving forward,17 and each successive capital investment decision in new energy
infrastructure will represent an irreversible choice for decades into the future. But these
concerns need not necessitate a wholesale reconstruction of energy law. Rather, we think
that the transition to a post-carbon energy sector presents regulators an opportunity to
draw from some of energy law’s traditional tools to better approach risk compensation—
encouraging a more adaptive and flexible grid than in the past, while also attracting new
investment by addressing stranded costs proactively in ways that recognize both market
and non-market values.
Moving forward, a presumption in favor of stranded cost compensation based on
the fact of past stranded compensation could be counterproductive, delaying and
frustrating the transition towards decarbonization. But realistically, some stranded cost
compensation will be essential to the decarbonization transition. If approached in a
careful manner, stranded cost recovery can facilitate a transition toward decarbonization
by encouraging investors and firms to better price the core market and non-market
attributes of energy resources. In order to do so, regulators need to pay attention to the
timing of cost allocation, avoiding the temptation to address stranded costs only at the
back end of the carbon transition. For example, as discussed in more detail below,
regulators making decisions regarding major new infrastructure projects like pipelines
and transmission lines should be attentive to stranded cost issues before approving
projects, instead of waiting to address stranded costs only after change has occurred.18
Regulators providing for stranded cost recovery must also be attentive to social
values that are not currently priced in energy markets. Changes associated with
decarbonization present a particularly propitious opportunity for regulators to address
important values such as reliability and carbon impacts of various energy resources in
stranded cost compensation, especially where the competitive energy markets fail to price
these features of energy resources.19 This Article proposes some ways for stranded cost
recovery to better recognize these positive benefits associated with regulatory transitions
for new energy resources, without conflicting with federal energy market policy.
Reforms that address regulatory risk through early stranded cost recovery will
inevitably come at some cost to consumers in the near term, yet a return on investment is
imperative to attracting capital for new infrastructure that will facilitate a balanced
portfolio of energy resources for a decarbonized grid. 20 If stranded costs for both new
and old resources are addressed with similar principles in mind, we believe that the net

17

Eliminating such commitments altogether would likely drive up the overall cost of capital for regulated
utilities. See Emily Hammond & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Clean Power Plan: Testing the Limits of
Administrative Law and the Electric Grid, 7 GEO.W. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 1 (2016).
18
See infra Part III.B.1.
19 For discussion of the general issue, see Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract
in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141 (2016).
20
Low returns available to investors are often seen as a barrier to attracting the investment necessary to
decarbonize the electric power sector. See, e.g., WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY:
ATTRACTING INVESTMENT TO BUILD TOMORROW’S ELECTRICITY SECTOR (2015), at
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFUSA_FutureOfElectricity_Report2015.pdf.
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effect will be to reduce the overall cost of capital related to investment in a decarbonized
energy system.
I.

Energy Law’s Stranded Cost History

Over the past half century, the energy sector has undergone some remarkable
transformations. The regulatory contract that has predominated energy law’s history
envisions a utility taking on customer service obligations in exchange for a guarantee that
its investors will be compensated for risk.21 Even with traditional rate regulation,
changing economic conditions, technological obsolescence, and unexpected shifts in
regulatory approach have presented a threat to investors in energy firms.22 Specifically,
investors have faced a risk that an energy utility’s investments would be rendered
stranded as a result of transitions. If energy law did not find ways to compensate
investors for stranded costs, this could adversely affect the overall cost of capital for new
infrastructure, requiring firms to incur higher interest rates to attract debt and equity
investors.
Over the past half century, the energy industry has undergone three important
stranded cost experiments: disallowance of construction costs for canceled nuclear
power plants in the 1980s;23 “take-or-pay” natural gas supply contracts associated with
open access in gas pipelines;24 and stranded power generation assets associated with a
transition to competitive electric power markets.25 As described in more detail below, in
each of these scenarios significant amounts of economic capital were threatened by
transition. As each transition took place, energy investors (and utilities) made forecasts
of major economic loss and, at the extreme, financial catastrophe. In most instances,
regulators drew on tools (often with controversy) to mitigate adverse financial impacts
associated with impending transition. By deferring any focus on compensating investors
for the risks of change to the future, regulators in the past were able to keep the cost of
new capital for energy firms low, although once chonge was imminent the focus shifted
to stranded cost compensation as a way to address these risks ex post.
Despite some industry prognostications, the sky never did fall with past energy
industry transitions. But that also does not mean that stranded cost compensation always
See Hammond & Spence, supra note [22], at 149-51 (describing traditional
regulation).
22 E.g., Pierce, supra note [12] .
21

23

Though less frequently mentioned, this issue extended to coal-fired plants as well. See Pierce, Regulatory
Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect, supra note [12] (documenting both nuclear and coal-fired plant
cancellations).

E.g., Holly C. Doane, Take-Or-Pay: FERC’s Regulatory Dilemma, 2 Spg. Natural Res.
& Env’t 18, 18 (1987) (“No other issue in the history of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) has caused such paralysis . . . .”).
25 See Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking Toward Regulatory
Federalism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goods,
100 MICH. L. REV. 1768, 1778-79 & n.25 (describing stranded cost recovery
associated with California deregulation and collecting criticisms).
24
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produced good results. In the past, regulators consistently favored stranded cost
compensation ex post—that is, after projects (and their expected investments costs) had
been approved, and sometimes decades after assets had been constructed and used to
produce and deliver energy. By only really addressing the issue of stranded costs after
initial investment decisions have been made, many regulators based stranded cost
calculations on perceived investor losses related to a large-scale, already-approved capital
asset. This ex post environment for determining stranded costs invited industry
stakeholders to present regulators with grossly exaggerated claims of the adverse impact
of a transition on the firm’s investors, and to present little or no evidence of how change
would produce benefits for the firm or others. This approach to stranded cost
compensation may have assuaged regulators, firms, and their investors, but it resulted in a
myopia that exaggerated stranded costs losses to investors, delayed regulatory change,
and ignored any broader assessment of the social costs and benefits associated with
transitioning. Regulators determining stranded costs in this manner did a poor job of
separating the ordinary economic and technological risks that any business investor
would expect, from regulatory risks over which firms have little or no control.
A. Past Stranded Cost Experiments
As should be evident, discussions of stranded costs in the energy industry are
hardly new. Threats to investor expectations due to new technologies or changing
economic conditions have a long legacy in regulated industries. For example, the impact
of new technologies and new market entrants was at the core of the dispute of the
landmark Charles River Bridge case, which clarified principles surrounding monopoly
and innovation prior to industrial development.26 In deciding that important case 180
years ago, the Supreme Court endorsed the principle that a monopoly’s charter should be
interpreted narrowly to favor new entrants.27 Yet stranded cost compensation
experiments over the past 50 years in the energy industry seem to run against the grain of
this longstanding principle, with regulators consistently finding ways to ensure that
investor-backed expectations are not upset by industry changes. As these experiments
show, instead of being wary of stranded costs, regulators have shown a considerable
appetite for compensating investors post hoc, routinely approving customer charges
designed to guarantee an incumbent energy utility 100% compensation for stranded costs
during regulatory, economic and technological transitions in the energy sector.
1. Excess Capacity and Canceled Nuclear Power Plants
One high profile stranded cost issue was associated with new nuclear power
plants—many of which were canceled mid-construction—and the subsequent
disallowance of cost recovery by regulatory commissions in the 1970s and 80s.28 In the
late 1960s and early 1970s, nuclear power looked like a prudent investment: electricity
26

The Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. the Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837).
Id. For discussion see STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES
RIVER BRIDGE CASE (1971).
28
See EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 400-02 (4th ed. 2015) (describing
changes in the nuclear energy sector over time).
27
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demand was projected to sharply increase, and nuclear power (and coal) appeared to be a
far better investment than oil- and gas-fired plants.29 Not only was nuclear power
projected to be less costly to operate, but natural gas was in very short supply, and the
United States had national security concerns about relying on foreign oil.30 But by the late
1970s and into the 1980s, things changed. Demand did not increase as expected, Three
Mile Island prompted concerns about the safety of nuclear power, and both world oil and
the domestic natural gas markets underwent substantial price reductions. Utilities were
left holding excess generating capacity, and it became clear that newer power generation
technologies could produce power more cheaply than nuclear plants. Over 120 partially
constructed plants were canceled, and the question of how to address the resulting
stranded costs loomed large.31
In the end, many of these plants received full or at least partial cost recovery. As
Richard Pierce describes it, the policy effect of the regulatory response was to provide
many private utilities compensation for what, in retrospect, were considered mistakes—
perhaps in part because the regulatory process encouraged investment in large base load
power generation plants.32 Forcing the utilities to bear the full costs of cancelations would
have ignored this regulatory relationship and, moreover, would serve to increase the
overall cost of capital associated with these investments, perhaps putting the utility out of
business.33 On the other hand, allowing full cost recovery for every loss a firm would
incur due to mistaken investment decisions would unfairly burden customers—making it
politically untenable and significantly diverging from how a competitive market would
approach investment risks.34
Some jurisdictions famously did not allow for stranded cost recovery at all. In the
landmark decision Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,35 for example, the Supreme Court
rejected a Takings Clause challenge brought by the owners of canceled nuclear power
plants that had been denied cost recovery for investments that had been deemed prudent
when they were initially made.36 More often, however, state commissions allowed
nuclear power companies to recover from customers at least some of their stranded costs,

29

Pierce, Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect. supra note [12] at 500-01.
Id.
31
EISEN ET AL., supra note [31], at 401.
32
See Pierce, Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect, supra note [12].
33
See Legislative Utility Consumers’ Council v. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 402 A.2d 626
(N.H. 1979) (describing financial struggles of utility undertaking nuclear power plant construction).
34
Pierce, Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect, supra note [12], at 506.
35
488 U.S. 299 (1989).
36
Id. at 302-03. Though the Court was not receptive to utilities’ claim that the Constitution requires
stranded cost recovery for cancelled nuclear plants, it also did not dismiss the idea that the Constitution
provides a floor to protect investor-based expectations. At the extreme, the Court noted, a rate still could
be so low that it is confiscatory, especially if a firm is not allowed to compensate its investors at all for the
financial risks that they incur. Id. at 315 (citing FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S., 591 602 (1944)
(“[R]eturn to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises
having corresponding risks.”)). In addition, a regulator cannot “arbitrarily switch back and forth between
methodologies in a way which required investors to bear the risks of bad investments at some times while
denying them the benefits of good investments at others . . . .” Id. at 315.
30
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whether these were attributed to excess capacity or for canceled plants.37 And a few
plants under construction during this time were permitted to recover from customers for
construction works in progress (CWIP), representing regulators’ recognition of the
uncertain economic and regulatory environment for new nuclear plants and the need for
substantial lines of credit early in the construction phase.38
Significantly, canceled nuclear plants were not a transition cost that regulators or
investors had accurately predicted at the time that plants were approved in the first place.
Rather, these stranded cost recovery decisions were routinely made after plants had
undergone “prudency” review (the reasonableness review rate regulators apply to new
investments) and were approved for construction. Still, routine ex post stranded cost
recovery, independent of the initial decision of the firm (and its investors) to incur the
costs of nuclear power generation facilities, could have an undeniable impact on the cost
of capital and investment decisions. If, at the time of making investment decisions,
investors had routinely expected this kind of ex post compensation (and perhaps the
regulatory contract encouraged them to do so), the initial cost of capital for a regulated
utility would be lower than that of a competitive firm because utility regulators (and the
regulatory contract) effectively insured the risk of change for private investors. Against
the backdrop of rate regulation, this artificially low cost of capital could have encouraged
overinvestment in large “base load” plants (i.e., those that must run at or near their full
capacity to meet customer load, typically nuclear and coal plants), contributing even
further to excess capacity. On the other hand, if no compensation for harms caused by
regulatory change was expected by investors ex ante (i.e., at the time of the initial
investment in the firm), investors would demand a risk premium (and a higher return on
investment) to insure themselves against the possibility of change, so without stranded
cost recovery the firm’s cost of capital would need to be priced higher to reflect this risk.
A higher cost of capital would have discouraged new investments in these assets, given
that regulators were attentive to the cost of capital in approving new investments and
setting utility rates, so some stranded cost recovery provided regulators a delicate way of
balancing a need for investor certainty to attract capital with regulators need to keep the
cost of capital for new infrastructure as low as possible, to minimize the immediate
impacts of new infrastructure on customer rates.
2. Natural Gas Pipelines and Take-Or-Pay Contracts
A second stranded cost recovery experiment from the past half-century is
associated with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) implementation of
open access in natural gas pipelines to encourage competition in interstate gas supply
markets. Congress began restructuring the natural gas industry in the late 1980s by
37

Examples are detailed throughout Pierce, Regulatory Treatent of Mistakes in Retrospect, supra note [12]

.
38

E.g., Legislative Utility Consumers’ Council v. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 402 A.2d 626
(N.H. 1979) (upholding state commission’s authority to allow construction funds for Seabrook nuclear
plant to be recovered in CWIP); cf. Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1185-86
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that FERC might permissibly allow utilities to include some unamortized costs of
canceled plants in rate base).
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unbundling gas sales from pipeline transportation services and providing equal access to
the latter.39 This approach recognized that traditional gas regulation’s approach to setting
single rate for pipeline gas had failed to see that there are two or more distinct markets
bundled together, only one of which is a natural monopoly (i.e., the “pipes”). FERC set
out to “unbundle” these distinct markets, implementing an “open access” regulatory
scheme that applies only to the natural monopoly market so that all producers had
comparable access to the pipelines to ship their gas to the buyer who offers them the best
deal.40
However, pipelines’ stranded costs presented a barrier to the transition to this new
competitive market.41 In order to support pipeline construction and operation, many
pipelines had committed billions of dollars in long-term “take-or-pay” contracts at very
high prices. These contracts obligated pipelines to pay suppliers, even when pipelines
could not take the gas.42 In initially addressing the transition to pipeline deregulation,
FERC refused to grant pipeline requests for take-or-pay relief.43 FERC’s Order 436,44
described by the D.C. Circuit as a “complete restructuring” of the industry,45 did not
provide for any take-or-pay compensation because pipelines were successfully
negotiating themselves out of these obligations without FERC’s assistance.46 But the
S.C. Circuit vacated Order 436, accusing FERC of “blindness” to the impacts of open
access on pipelines, as well as a “tendency to elevate into affirmative benefits what are at
best palliatives.”47 Without tangible take-or-pay contract relief, the D.C. Circuit likened
the voluntary open access option FERC had provided pipelines to “the choice between
the noose and the firing squad.”48 When FERC continued to refuse any compensation for
take-or-pay contracts on remand, the D.C. Circuit again rejected the agency’s approach,
charging FERC with attempting to delay indefinitely until the issue went away.49
FERC addressed the issue in Order 500, which adopted an equitable splitting of
take-or-pay costs.50 As FERC stated there:
The Commission recognizes that it is difficult to assign
blame for the pipeline industry’s take-or-pay problems. In
brief, no one segment of the natural gas industry or
particular circumstance appears wholly responsible for the
See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead to
Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L. J. 1 (1988).
40 Id.
41
For discussion, see Donald F. Santa, Jr. & Clifford S. Sikora, Open Access and Transition Costs: Will the
Electric Industry Transition Track the Natural Gas Industry Restructuring?, 15 ENERGY L.J. 273 (1994).
42 For an overview, see EISEN ET AL., supra note [31].
43
Order 380, 49 Fed. Reg. at 22,779, 22, 282 (1984).
44
Order 436, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985).
45
Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“AGD I”)
46
Id. at 1023.
47
Id. at 1025.
48
Id. at 1024.
49
Am. Gas Ass’n v. FERC, 888 F.2d 136, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
50
Order 500, 52 Fed. Reg. at 30,334 (1987).
39
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pipelines’ excess inventories of gas. As a result, all
segments should shoulder some of the burden of resolving
the problem.51
In Order 500, FERC still failed to endorse full recovery of pipeline stranded costs,
perhaps because the very existence of these take-or-pay contracts indicated that pipelines
were aware of some risks of changing economic conditions. In Order 636, the order that
completed FERC’s gas pipeline restructuring, FERC finally allowed pipelines to bill
customers for 100% of their remaining stranded costs,52 though the agency was also
careful to note that the equitable sharing approach of the past (as endorsed in Order 500)
had been necessary to “encourage pipelines to share some of the cost of the extraordinary
take-or-pay liabilities of the early and mid-1980s.”53 Although the D.C. Circuit had made
it clear that FERC could not completely ignore the impact on investors of take-or-pay
contracts during pipeline market restructuring, it bears emphasis that the agency was
never legally obligated to provide 100% recovery for stranded costs associated with
transitioning from regulated to competitive gas markets—even though Order 636
ultimately took this policy position.
The nature of the stranded costs incurred by pipelines during this transition
differed from nuclear stranded costs. Fuel costs are a relatively small component of the
costs of operating a nuclear power plant, so nuclear stranded cost compensation debates
were driven by the fixed costs of the assets. By contrast, given how pipeline contracts
were executed in the industry, pipelines’ claims to stranded costs were driven almost
entirely by the volatility in gas markets. The use of stranded cost recovery to compensate
firms for this risk made it even more difficult for regulators to assess which risks were
appropriate for investors, on the one hand, as opposed to consumers, on the other. Still,
as with nuclear power plants, stranded cost recover for take-or-pay contracts was
approved post hoc, after these contracts were executed, so this was not a risk that pipeline
investors were presumably compensated for in their initial return on investment. Ex post
stranded cost recovery helped to keep the cost of capital for approved pipeline projects
low, while also providing investors compensation for risks of change as they
materialized, rather than in a higher return on their initial investment.
3. Competitive Restructuring of the Electric Power Industry
A third and more recent experiment with stranded cost recovery relates to
competitive restructuring of the electric power industry in the 1990s. For most of the
twentieth century, the electric utility had been regulated as a natural monopoly, but a
range of reforms in the 1970s and 80s led to efforts to restructure the industry towards
competitive markets, much in the manner that FERC had reformed natural gas markets.54
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Order 500, 52 Fed. Reg. at 30,337.
Order 636, 57 Fed. Fed. 13,267 (Apr. 16, 1992).
53
Id. at 13,308.
54 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The State of the Transition to Competitive Markets in Natural Gas and
Electricity, 15 ENERGY L.J. 323 (1994).
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This transition revived a concern about constitutional takings of the sort that
pepper the history of energy law,55 repackaged for this particular set of events as
“deregulatory takings.”56 These stranded cost claims included requests to allow
regulatory compensation for some power plant assets that were no longer considered
valuable in competitive power markets, in a similar manner to canceled nuclear plants.57
However, many firms’ claims to stranded cost from electric power restructuring also
related to lost expected income given the change in regulatory rules. Just as with gas
pipeline stranded cost compensation, this kind of focus on income streams stranded by
regulatory transition challenged the ability of regulators to separate ordinary business
risks over which the firm (and its investors) have some degree of control, from regulatory
risks associated with the transition to competitive electric power markets.58 Estimates of
utilities’ stranded costs in the transition to competitive electric power markets ranged
from $10 billion to $500 billion, with most estimates falling in the $100 billion to $200
billion range.59
As with nuclear power plants’ stranded cost recovery, courts were not receptive to
legal claims that the Constitution required full compensation for all revenue lost during a
transition to a competitive electricity market.60 However, despite a lack of any judicial
mandate to provide for full stranded cost compensation, regulators routinely found ways
to help mitigate the stranded cost impacts on firms and investors of the regulatory
transition to competitive markets. In Order 888, issued in 1996, FERC adopted an open
access regime for wholesale electric power supply, similar to its competitive market
approach for natural gas.61 In contrast to FERC’s initial shared cost allocation for takeor-pay contracts,62 FERC allowed utility shareholders to recover 100% of the stranded
costs associated with transitioning to a competitive wholesale power supply industry.63 In
adopting retail competition plans, states such as California also allowed for full stranded
cost recovery.64 Importantly, however, some states transitioning to competitive retail

E.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989) (takings challenge
regarding cost recovery for canceled nuclear power plants); Fed. Power Comm’n v.
Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (takings challenge for method of computing
cost recovery).
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J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT
(1997).
57 Id.
58 Cf. Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 TEX. L. REV. 297, 307 (1998) (reviewing J.
GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT:
THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997))
59
See CBO PAPER, ELECTRIC UTILITIES: DEREGULATION AND STRANDED COSTS 15 (Oct. 1998).
60
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and Electricity Stranded Cost Treatments, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 71 (1998); Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim
Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435 (2000).
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Order 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996).
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Id. at 93.
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power markets refused to allow for the full recovery of stranded costs or denied them
altogether.65
B. Stranded Cost Myopia
These past experiments with stranded cost recovery and the tools used by
regulators to address them share some common characteristics that contributed to a
blinkered regulatory perspective, distorting the cost of capital to consistently favor old
energy infrastructure over new entrants and new projects. Importantly, they were not
driven by judicial mandate66 so much as by political and regulatory processes that invited
utilities (and their investors) to invest resources in lobbying for compensation for the
stranded costs associated with industry changes, typically in the form of additional
charges that customers would pay in their future bills. While this approach to stranded
cost compensation was designed to ensure that the firm would be able to continue to
attract capital at a low cost to customers, it also served to lock in the status quo, resulting
in delays in industry transitions, including slowing the onset of new technologies.67 The
narrowly focused nature of these past experiments related to both the timing of stranded
cost recovery, and a regulatory lack of appreciation for values beyond the immediate
adverse financial impact of transitions on investors.
1.

Ex Post Recovery Mechanisms

As we have described, a common feature of these past experiments with stranded
cost compensation is an appetite, on the part of both regulators and firms, for transition
cost recovery at the back end of investment decisions. These past examples do not
illustrate a regulatory process that makes a concerted effort to address stranded costs
before investment decisions are made or at the time of their initial approval. Hindsight is
always 20/20, so such ex post recovery of stranded costs serves to avert
acknowledgement of any past mistakes on the part of regulators or firms. On the other
hand, providing compensation for investment decisions gone wrong only ex post can look
more like a form of industry bailout than traditional cost-based decisionmaking, which
would encourage actors to price any risk of change into their initial investment decisions.

65

California allowed for 100% stranded cost recovery in its retail market transition; other states, by
contrast, provided for only partial stranded cost recovery or were outright hostile to stranded cost recovery
claims, forcing firms to take the initiative in selling off uneconomic assets. For discussion, see Elizabeth
A. Nowicki, Denial of Regulatory Assistance in Stranded Cost Recovery in a Deregulated Electricity
Industry, 32 LOY.-L.A. L. REV. 431, 442-43 (1999).
66
See Rossi, supra note [28], at 307 (noting that since Market Street Railway v. Railroad Comm’n, 324 U.S
548 (1945), “courts have consistently imposed on regulated firms the risk of changing technological and
economic circumstances.”).
67
This, of course, was one of the concerns famously raised by the Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge
and rejected by Chief Justice Taney’s majority, which reasoned that the loss of profit from the construction
of a new bridge was simply irrelevant to determining the state’s contractual obligations surrounding a
monopoly charter, especially where the public stood to benefit from new technology. The Proprietors of
the Charles River Bridge v. the Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 544 (1837) (noting any
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These experiments show that stranded cost compensation helped to routinely
ensure that investor risks were not ignored. As described above, however, this practice
could contribute to an artificially low initial cost of capital for new investments. If
regulators themselves were insuring against regulatory change, investors (and the firm)
had no incentive to demand a return on investment that prices the risks of regulatory
change in present value as new infrastructure investment decisions were made. As
Richard Pierce has chronicled, for example, with respect to the stranded cost problems
associated with excess nuclear capacity, the regulatory tools used to address those
problems exacerbated the problem, arguably encouraging rate-regulated utilities to
overinvest in certain forms of power supply.68
At the same time, energy law’s historic appetite for back-end cost recovery with
changing circumstances systematically encouraged firms to lobby against regulatory
change and, once changed seemed imminent, to make inflated claims for stranded cost
recovery. To take one example, with impending competitive restructuring of the electric
power industry, the industry claimed that stranded costs would be in the hundreds of
billions, and that restructuring would potentially force many utilities into bankruptcy.69
Not every firm made substantial profits in the transition to competitive markets, but today
it is recognized that the actual stranded costs incurred by firms were far less—closer to
$10 billion—even though the regulatory and legislative process provided for transition
recovery in excess of $100 billion.70 Addressing stranded costs after an investment
decision is more likely to lead to systematic overcompensation for regulatory risk
because of loss aversion, or the exaggerated value a firm (especially a regulated firm with
long-lived, capital intensive assets) might place on losing revenue streams they have
received in the past.71 Out of fear of seeing their past investments lose existing revenue,
many energy firms and their investors routinely overstated their stranded cost losses.72
Regulators too feared criticism for past decisions they made, and therefore were often
complicit in approving stranded cost recovery for energy infrastructure that they
approved or encouraged. The expectation that regulators would provide a back-end
bailout—as happened with excess nuclear capacity, take-or-pay-contracts, and
competitive restructuring—encouraged firms to aggressively use the regulatory process
to further prolong the revenue streams associated with their assets.73
These experiments with stranded cost recovery also show how energy regulators
routinely confused different kinds of risk in compensating firms for stranded costs. Risks
of economic and technological change were frequently lumped together in discussions of
stranded cost recovery, perhaps because the expectation of recovery alleviated any need
68
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for fine-tuning. As stranded cost compensation shifted from focusing on a specific
capital asset (as with nuclear power plants) to focusing on broader investor expectations
about issues that were tied to things such as long-term contracts and fuel costs, regulatory
risks (over which presumably firms and their investors had little or no control) became
muddled with ordinary business risks, over which firms and their investors had some
degree of control. The result may have been to encourage a moral hazard problem of
sorts, leading to overinvestment in energy infrastructure and more excess capacity:
Utility investors could expect some compensation at the back-end not only for risks of
regulatory change, but for routine business risks associated with changes in economic and
technological conditions as well.74
2. Stranded Values of Past Stranded Cost Recovery
In addition to contributing to excess capacity and discouraging private pricing of
risk, energy law’s past experiments with stranded cost recovery did a poor job of
recognizing the private and social gains associated with transitions. A fixation on the
regulatory contract focused primarily on harms related to financial impacts to the firm
and its investors. Regulators gave little consideration to “stranded benefits,” that is, the
offsetting advantages that a transition might also present to those firms or investors that
were claiming harm.75 For example, in the transition to competitive electric power
markets, after restructuring, many utilities retained transmission lines that would become
valuable new profit centers in their future operations.76 Another such benefit is the value
older baseload power plants might provide as a reliability and price hedge when
competitive electric power markets presented new volatilities. Such benefits were often
ignored or downplayed in stranded cost debates. Indeed, there is some evidence to
suggest that firms held back on disclosing their plans to exploit new opportunities with
deregulation (and hence any stranded benefits) until regulators had resolved stranded cost
compensation.77
Moreover, past stranded cost experiments made almost no mention of the broader
social costs and benefits associated with a regulatory transition, or its impact on the
energy system. Regulators’ focus on compensating firm-specific investor value provided
for little serious consideration of the social costs associated with industry transitions. An
emphasis on the financial impact of stranded investments to investors left little room for
regulators to address other values like energy reliability or the environmental attributes of
energy resources. Little or no attention was given to the costs imposed on others, such as
new entrants or workers. Given the lack of any pricing for environmental externalities,
neither was serious attention given to the environmental impact of the utility’s investment
74
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decisions. If an investor suffered a financial loss, a stranded cost was considered equally
meritorious for compensation, whether it supported the operation of a polluting coal plant
or a nuclear plant or pipeline, each of which imposes very different impacts on
surrounding communities.78 A decision to compensate stranded costs meant that a
resource would continue to operate into the future, but by prolonging the life of obsolete
infrastructure without considering broader social costs and benefits, it also left many noneconomic values stranded. In other words, looking at the financial impacts of each
energy resource on investors and the firm in isolation for purposes of stranded cost
compensation has blinded regulators to considering how cost recovery for particular
sources of energy supply has broader system-wide effects on the grid, or the broaded
balance of energy resources in the nation’s power supply portfolio.
II.

Decarbonization’s Impending Stranded Investment Threat

Decarbonization of the grid will not come cheap.79 It stands to be one of the most
significant economic transformations our economy has experienced in the last century. 80
To the extent that the stranded costs associated with the transition to decarbonization
have never been addressed, this threatens to slow any change, contributing to carbon
lock-in in the energy sector81 and discouraging new investment dollars from flowing to
new decarbonized energy infrastructure. As these transitions occur, we can predict that
industry (and its investors) will continue to show a reluctance to retire any assets that
have remaining useful life, regardless of their environmental attributes or whether those
investments are stranded because of regulatory change, market forces, or technological
innovation. We can expect these firms to aggressively seek ex post compensation. We
also can expect incumbent firms to couch the potential for financial losses with the
transition in stranded investment terms, inviting the regulatory process to leave important
other values stranded.
Changes to infrastructure are already beginning to happen, leading to these kinds
of claims for stranded cost compensation. This observation is perhaps most salient for
existing coal plants, many of which are expected to be phased out of operation with the
78
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regulation of carbon emissions, as well as existing nuclear plants.82 No doubt, some
existing infrastructure will no longer be considered valuable as new environmental
regulations come into effect and energy markets begin to price carbon emissions into
investment decisions. Many existing assets will need to be retired to make room for more
efficient and less polluting sources of energy, leading to a major shift in investment in the
industry. Equally important, we maintain, is that new investment must simultaneously be
pursued to allow decarbonization to succeed—which might include a massive investment
in new-generation nuclear plants, combined-cycle natural gas plants, large-scale new
solar and wind projects, and the transportation infrastructure such as pipelines and
transmission lines that will interconnect these resources. The transition to
decarbonization shows how stranded cost issues are not unique to old resources, but will
be increasingly important for new investments. We highlight here the stranded
investment issues decarbonization presents for some of these resources, which are already
giving rise to new pleas for stranded cost compensation by incumbent firms in the
industry. We focus on fossil fuel power plants, nuclear power plants, and energy
transportation infrastructure.
A. Fossil Fuel Power Plants
Coal and natural gas power plants account for more than 60% of the grid’s energy
supply portfolio.83 Many of these plants have already been in operation for decades.
Given the high fixed costs that have been paid to build and keep these plants in operation,
firms face strong incentives to keep them in operation as long as they produce positive
revenue streams from energy sales. The marginal costs to the firm of using these plants
to produce energy can be very low, depending on the price of the fuel they use to produce
the next unit of energy.84 The impact of the carbon transition on these “legacy” fossil fuel
plants presents one of the most significant stranded cost barriers to the decarbonization
transition.
Coal-fired power is the obvious loser in the transition to a low-carbon future.85
The Clean Power Plan (CPP) expressly contemplates a phase-out of existing coal—to be
replaced in the short term by increased utilization of natural gas combined cycle (NGCC),
See Coal is Going, Going, Gone?, UTILITY DIVE BLOG, April 24, 2014, at
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/coal-is-going-going-gone/253641/ (discussing EIA’s predictions
of the retirement of a significant number of coal-based power plants, along with a growth in natural
gas power generation); Hammond & Spence, supra note >> (discussing challenges for nuclear power
plants).
83
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and ultimately by increased new renewables penetration.86 Moreover, other Clean Air Act
(CAA) mandates—including the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule87 and the Utility MACT
Rule88—have put pressure on coal-fired power in recent years, increasing both the capital
and operating costs associated with such plants.89 These are regulatory changes, but they
should not be a surprise. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments directed EPA to address
both cross-state air quality issues for criteria pollutants and toxic emissions from the
power sector.90 And although greenhouse gas (GHG) regulation under the CAA may have
come as a surprise to some,91 the power sector’s role in climate change has long been
recognized.92 At the very least, serious conversations about mitigation in the United
States are nearing a decade old.
Market forces have also put pressure on coal. Natural gas has stepped in as a
baseload competitor; its low prices have made it attractive to investors funding new
power plants, and have also contributed to low short-run marginal costs, making it a hard
competitor to beat on the competitive wholesale markets.93 In fact, in its rule for new
sources of carbon dioxide emissions in the electricity sector, EPA justified its strict
approach for coal-fired power partly by explaining that very little new coal will be built
anyway given these market forces.94
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The result is that coal-fired power plants are closing, coal companies are going
bankrupt,95 and coal’s share of power generation is expected to decrease from well over
half in the 1990s and early 2000s to about 18% by 2040.96 Despite these negative results
for coal companies and coal-industry workers, there are significant carbon and other airquality benefits to be gained by weaning ourselves from coal.97 But it is also true that
there are social costs associated with closing these plants. In parts of the country where
natural gas pipeline capacity is lacking—for example, the northeast during winter’s high
demand—coal provides the security of reliability because the fuel itself is easily stored.98
Furthermore, the economies of coal-producing states like West Virginia are heavily
dependent on the resource. As just one metric, tens of thousands of jobs have been lost in
the the coal industry in recent years..99
As coal’s share of the electricity supply wanes, natural gas’s share is growing. In
many states today, almost all of the new power plant capacity coming online is natural
gas. The use of natural gas to produce electricity is expected to continue to increase in the
near future, given its abundant supply, low costs relative to other fuel sources, and lower
carbon impacts compared to other fossil fuels.100 In contrast to older baseload coal
plants, natural gas plants are usually built as peaking resources (i.e., those that are
primarily deployed to meet peak customer loads) and offer many efficiencies as load
following resources that can complement the integration of variable resources such as
wind and solar into the grid.101
Yet one lurking concern is overinvestment in natural gas power plants for
purposes of power supply, which could readily lead to overreliance on the fuel as a
generation resource. For example, the Union of Concerned Scientists has warned that
many states’ heavy short-term reliance on natural gas plants presents a long-term risk of
locking in investments in power plants that could peak in use by 2030, potentially
creating massive new excess capacity problems.102 Concerns with the grid’s future
overreliance on natural gas are heightened by the need for increased decarbonization over
the coming decades, as natural gas is not carbon-free; as some scholars have argued,
meeting our climate policy goals will require “eliminating virtually all” of our natural gas
95
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use by 2050.103 The prospect of future stranded costs for natural gas, akin to what is
currently being claimed in the coal industry, seems highly likely a decade or two into the
decarbonization transition.104
B. Nuclear Power Plants
Nuclear power represents approximately 20% of the nation’s power supply
portfolio.105 However, many existing plants are facing early retirement, largely as a result
of the competitive electricity markets’ failure to value carbon.106 But decarbonization
scenarios anticipate that nuclear power, which has no carbon emissions, will need to
increase and new plants will need to be built.107 This makes nuclear plants a significant
potential stranded cost issue for the decarbonization transition as well.
Like coal, nuclear power provides steady, reliable baseload electricity with a
fueling schedule that insulates it from the pipeline capacity issues that can plague natural
gas.108 Unlike coal and natural gas, nuclear power does not emit criteria pollutants, toxics,
or greenhouse gases.109 Thus, it has not been subject to the same CAA regulatory
pressures as coal in recent years—though it has always been a highly regulated
industry.110 Nevertheless, nuclear power is struggling on the competitive wholesale
markets; several plants have begun the decommissioning process, and others are currently
listed as marginal.111 The reasons relate to the dynamics of imperfect competitive
markets. Because nuclear power must always run, it is a price-taker, meaning it will take
whatever clearing price the wholesale markets provide regardless of its actual short-run
marginal or long-run average costs.112 Low natural gas prices and increasing renewables
penetration have contributed to lower market clearing prices.113 And without a price on
carbon, the market is imperfect, making it harder for nuclear power to compete given its
significant continued operational and safety costs.114
Nuclear power plants operating outside of the competitive wholesale markets
have not encountered these challenges. In fact, the most prominent new reactors under
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construction are in Georgia and South Carolina,115 where the regulatory contract
continues to provide cost recovery through ratemaking and can further be used to hedge
future uncertainties.116 Thus, whether a nuclear reactor is at risk of becoming a stranded
asset may well depend on the restructuring status of its jurisdiction.117
From the perspective of a post-carbon grid, the position of nuclear reactors raises
important stranded-cost issues—albeit issues that present different stakes than existing
coal plants. Consider that existing reactors contribute over 60% of the nation’s carbonfree electricity,118 and when reactors are shut down, carbon emissions increase.119
Achieving carbon emission reduction goals will require continued reliance on existing
nuclear plants, as well as substantial new investment in nuclear plants.120 The Clean
Power Plan (CPP)121 does not afford credit to states that retain existing nuclear power, but
it does give credit for plant uprates and new reactors.122 Further, the CPP contemplates
that credit trading may be the easiest path to compliance.123 Marginal plants thus face a
temporal gap: at the moment—before the CPP has taken effect and while there is no real
price on carbon—these plants could be considered stranded assets. But in the next
decade, it is likely that their value from a carbon perspective will increase—whether from
the CPP or some other climate change mitigation policy. New York, for example, has
taken the policy view that nuclear power should help bridge today’s carbon-heavy
electric sector to the low-carbon grid of the future.124 The stranded cost question is
whether—and if so, how—to support these plants while we await regulatory and market
dynamics that value their carbon contribution.
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C. Energy Transportation
Energy transportation is also not exempt from stranded-cost issues with
impending decarbonization. As noted above, construction of natural gas-fired power
plants is projected to increase over the next decade or so. Yet natural gas-fired electricity
requires not just power plants, but a transportation infrastructure. This necessity presents
even trickier future excess capacity problems that relate to gas production as well as
power plants.
Currently, there are a number of mismatches between the electricity and natural
gas markets. Among the issues is pipeline capacity: natural gas is sold on spot markets,
and the prices in recent times are significantly below their historically averages125 Electric
power suppliers buy natural gas on those spot markets, obtaining even lower prices by
taking interruptible service.126 Without long-term contracts, investors are reluctant to take
on the significant financial commitment needed to construct new natural gas pipelines.127
Paradoxically, natural gas is flared in some regions due to lack of pipeline
infrastructure128 even while there are shortages in other regions in the winter months
when natural gas is in demand for both heating and electricity generation.129 This lack of
pipeline infrastructure has already created some stranded costs. In some areas of the
country, for example, natural gas wells have been drilled but not completed due to the
lack of transportation to get natural gas to market.130
The CPP’s goals for carbon emission reduction contemplate that NGCC
utilization in the nation’s power supply portfolio—currently somewhere around 40%—
could increase to as high as 75% to replace coal-fired generation.131 Regional
transmission organization such as PJM and MISO both contemplate that achieving this
increased utilization would require major new pipeline infrastructure,132 and the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) has warned that significant pipeline
investment is needed to avoid reliability issues.133 This presents another stranded-cost
issue: will investors want to build this new infrastructure, knowing that the ultimate goal
See Taking a Look at Historical Natural Gas Prices (Jan. 25, 2015), available online at
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of the electricity sector is to wean ourselves from natural gas as well as coal? Keep in
mind as well that once that infrastructure is in place, there will be a new path
dependency: stranded-cost concerns could mean reliance on natural-gas fired power
longer than would be optimal from a climate change mitigation perspective.134 New
electricity transmission infrastructure presents similar stranded cost challenges: On one
hand, regulatory certainty is necessary to attract capital investments to build transmission
lines in new locations for the decarbonized grid. On the other hand, it is important that
new transmission lines do not help to prolong the asset life of older fossil fuel generation
power plants that would otherwise be retired – thus exasperating the carbon legacy plant
problem highlighted above.135
III.

Stranded Cost Compensation for Grid Decarbonization

These examples point to the almost intractable problem presented by irreversible
energy infrastructure investment decisions and the path dependencies they create—an
especially salient challenge given the transition to a significantly debarbonized energy
grid. History shows how energy law is consistently inept at retiring energy infrastructure
with any remaining life, though there are occasional counter-examples related to the
decommissioning of specific hydroelectric and nuclear facilities.136 With new stranded
cost issues already occurring or predictable in the near future, we turn now to how such
costs might best be handled as we transition to a decarbonized energy grid.
This Part first discusses whether, given structural changes the energy industry has
undergone in recent decades, regulators today might be more justified than ever in
ignoring stranded cost issues, including those associated with decarbonization’s
transition. But although these structural changes provide great promise for future private
management of many investor risks, stranded cost compensation during the transition to
deep carbonization may yet prove necessary. Still, regulators should not follow the model
of past stranded cost experiments. Instead, in making decisions today about our future
energy infrastructure, regulators have an opportunity to write a new stranded cost chapter
for energy law, one that both facilitates the transition to decarbonization while providing
a better balance between certainty and flexibility than in the past. Front-end stranded
cost recovery for incremental energy infrastructure investment decisions can attract new
capital for decarbonization by reducing uncertainty, while also ensuring that values
associated with energy reliability and carbon impacts are not left stranded during the
impending transition. In order to avoid distorting returns on investment to favor carbon
lock-in, regulators must address stranded costs associated with existing energy
134
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infrastructure under the same principles that they apply to incentives designed to reduce
uncertainty in the investment in new resources.
A. The Promise of Private Management of Stranded Costs
William Baumol and J. Greogory Sidak once predicted that the “new mode of
mixed competition and regulation” is one “in which no such problem [of stranded costs]
need arise again.”137 Compared to fifty years ago, private investors today are much better
equipped to address the risks of many energy transitions. The regulatory contract that
once described the industry can no longer be understood as a deal between a few firms
and the state.138 Shifts towards competitive energy markets have created a regulatory
environment that is much more multi-faceted in nature, with a range of firms, interest
groups, and stakeholders now serving as the main participants in any regulatory
bargain.139 Energy regulation today is not understood as a binding bilateral deal subject
to renegotiation each time a major new infrastructure decision is made, but is much more
fluid and ongoing in nature.140
If FERC’s competitive restructuring of wholesale gas and electric power markets
had been effective in making the energy sector perfectly competitive, then no firm or
investor in the energy industry today would face fundamentally different risks than any
other business. Order 888 made clear FERC’s preference for a market competition policy
based on open access, but we should be careful not to overstate either the scope or
success of competitive energy markets.141 FERC’s competitive restructuring efforts
addressed only the wholesale side of domestic energy markets, and even today, that
restructuring process is incomplete.142 State regulators retain significant control over
infrastructure related to retail gas and electric power sales, with most states continuing to
apply traditional cost-based regulation to infrastructure decisions regarding these
transactions.143
Even though the rules of the game for energy markets continue to evolve, it is
undeniable that some structural changes have created the potential for better private
management of business risks by firms and their investors. Under the traditional
regulatory contract, firms and their investors were much more homogenous, with most
regulation aimed at the traditional, vertically integrated utility. Today, the energy
industry is comprised of a much more diverse range of investors operating outside of
regulatory compact.144 Most new power generation today, for example, is non-utility
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generation—plants built by firms with whom no traditional regulatory compact can be
said to exist.145
In addition, with a greater range of firms operating in the industry, private
investors are better equipped to diversify risks themselves. For example, with the decline
of the traditional utility’s dominance in the electric power industry, today firms operating
in national markets are better equipped to diversify their investments across jurisdictions
and regions of the country.146 Also, in part due to technological innovations, the scale of
new energy supply investments is far smaller than the kinds of large-scale base load
plants that were characteristic of new investments in the 1960s and 1970s.147 This has
allowed for multiple, smaller-scale investments by larger firms that are better able to
diversify the assets on their balance sheets than utilities in the past.148 For example, many
firms with power plants that they consider to be uneconomic seek to securitize or sell
these assets by selling them (or spinning them off), 149 instead of asking regulators for
stranded cost recovery.
In addition, in recent decades financial regulation has improved the quality of
information about investments that is available to investors in energy firms. Corporate
disclosure expectations today are much more cognizant of potential changes in business
and technological conditions as well as regulatory regimes.150 One example is the
historical popularity of many utility stocks as low-risk investment vehicles in worker
pensions. Historically, pension managers may not have been required to disclose the full
risks of these investments, but institutional disclosure requirements for investment
managers have changed significantly.151 Historical utility accounting practices, which
were premised on rate recovery of asset costs, may have understated risks associated with
long-term capital investments against the backdrop of changing conditions—a risk that
firms today must disclose. Increasingly too, regulators are moving towards the disclosure
of future risks associated with climate change, and this should better enable investors to
price these risks in making future investment decisions.152 There is some evidence to
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suggest that disclosure may encourage firms to do little more than reassure investors,153
but at the very minimum investors today in the energy sectors are better informed about
risks than investors half a century ago.
These changes in the nature of regulation, industry structure, and risk disclosure
may not make concerns about transition costs irrelevant. But we would expect private
investors to be much better equipped to deal with transitions, especially where they
involve business assumptions or technology decisions over which investors are able to
assume risks themselves, or over which the firm has some degree of control. After all, the
history of energy regulation shows that transition is the only certainty, so we should not
allow new investors to claim surprise for the kinds of business risks that they can
control.154
Consider again the fuel costs that drove the stranded cost problem with pipelines’
take-or-pay contracts. Today, a pipeline operating on a national scale would be well
positioned to address the risks of changes on its own, and to hedge its take-or-pay
contracts with other instruments. Such developments point to modern investors being
much better equipped than in the past to address the stranded cost problem in making
their own risk decisions, particularly to the extent that stranded costs issues reflect
nothing more than ordinary business risks. Of course, we can still expect that the sheer
size of many energy infrastructure investments—along with their long-lived asset life—
will produce more significant transition cost problems down the road than are faced by
most sectors of the economy, but that should not deter regulators from encouraging
private investors to act on their own to price the risks of changes at the front end, where
they can do so.
B. Complementary Stranded Cost Recovery Mechanisms
Given the many private mechanisms for managing the risk of stranded costs, one
might argue that regulatory approaches for stranded cost recovery going forward are
either unnecessary or poor public policy because they create disincentives to address the
issue in the marketplace. No doubt, the regulatory process can do a better job of
encouraging investors to price risks themselves, especially the business risks of future
economic or technology changes. Encouraging investors to price these kinds of risks at
the time they make a decision to invest in assets could help to shift such risk to investors,
allowing regulators to focus on pricing those risks and transition costs over which they
have a comparative advantage, namely, the residual risk of unexpected regulatory change
or other values that are not represented in the competitive market.
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The regulatory bargain in energy markets remains much more of a moving target
than in most other sectors of the economy. Existing energy infrastructure may be more
capital-intensive and long-lived than the assets in other sectors of the economy, but even
in other sectors it is recognized how important it is for regulators to be attentive to the
transition costs associated with regulatory change.155 Changes in the energy industry in
recent decades thus do not render stranded costs concerns irrelevant, but provide energy
regulators an opportunity to give stranded cost recovery a new focus, better aligning
investor signals with core public values. We believe that stranded cost compensation
with the decarbonization transition presents some unique opportunities for regulatory
reform that can avoid stranded cost myopia, especially to the extent that prices and
investment signals in competitive energy markets fail to value reliability and
environmental attributes of energy resources.
To begin, consider the massive levels of infrastructure investment that will be
required to meet the goals of decarbonization. Keeping warming under 2 degrees Celsius
is estimated to require hundreds of billions of dollars of new capital investment over the
coming decades.156 Presumably, many of these new energy infrastructure investments
will be pursued because of their carbon emissions advantage over existing energy supply
resources. Unless the carbon attributes of energy supply are somehow priced in all
market decisions concerning these resources, however, the returns that firms offer to
investors may be too low to attract new investments, leading to underinvestment in new
resources and overdependence on old ones. In addition, uncertainties and high costs
surrounding new resources such as next-generation nuclear plants, offshore wind, and
electric power transmission have frightened investors from sinking capital into such
projects. To make new technological investments attractive, and to achieve the right
balance of energy resources for decarbonization, the returns offered to investors must
provide some premium for uncertainty while also pricing the carbon attributes and other
values that are important to the energy system. As is discussed above, traditional
stranded cost compensation gave little or no discussion to these forms of stranded
benefits in the calculated of stranded costs. Regulators paying attention to stranded costs
recovery as a mechanism for reducing uncertainty and addressing these values ex ante –
i.e., before each energy resource investment decision is made – may better facilitate a
transition to decarbonization that is attentive to the balance of resources in the energy
system as a whole. By avoiding wasteful ex post lobbying to address stranded costs
decades from now, it also could help to reduce the overall cost of capital for a
decarbonized energy system.
But approaching stranded costs only as a way of incentivizing investors to steer
capital to new decarbonized energy resources could also also be counterproductive. The
155
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transition to decarbonization is plagued by an old resource problem too, which if left
unaddressed can readily reinforce carbon lock-in.157 It is thus imperative to recognize the
challenge of addressing both new and old capital investment with the transition to
decarbonized energy infrastructrure. Subjecting old energy infrastructure to a different
stranded cost recovery than the principles used to incentivize investments in new
infrastructure risks distorting investor returns to favor carbon-lock by delaying new
investments.
With respect to existing investments, such as those discussed in Part II, stranded
cost recovery will remain important to ensuring that the transition to decarbonization
occurs in a timely manner, and is not delayed further by path dependency. While we are
not proposing a bailout of all existing assets, a failure to address stranded costs
concerning decarbonization of existing energy supply resources risks the possibility that
some transitions may never occur. Past experience has shown that some stranded cost
recovery might be a worthwhile price to pay for industry cooperation or even stakeholder
buy-in in the midst of a transition.158 Equally important in addressing stranded costs for
existing resources, however, regulators must be attentive to some important issues that
they have ignored in the past, or they will fail to address the social costs of transitions.
Specifically, as with new energy infrastructure, the transition issues presented by existing
resources underscores the importance of recognizing attributes of different energy
resources that competitive energy markets today do not value in their pricing mechanisms
in calculating stranded costs.
Before we proceed, we emphasize that our argument is pragmatic: we are not
contending that any one kind of stranded cost recovery is the most economically efficient
regulatory approach,159 or that it is required as a matter of contract or the Constitution.160
Instead, the regulatory approach we propose can provide forms of stranded cost recovery
that are politically expedient, reasonably justifiable, and useful for easing the transition to
a clean energy future.
1. Temporal Approaches and Considerations
As our historical examples show, energy law has traditionally dealt with stranded
costs for investors and firms once they arise, often long after initial private investment
decisions are made. This ex post form of stranded cost recovery contributes to some
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problematic behaviors in the regulatory process, by encouraging firms and their investors
to lobby against change, as well as discouraging firms and regulators from being attentive
to stranded benefits and to the public values that need to be protected in transitioning to a
new normal.161 It should not come as a surprise that the past forms of stranded cost
compensation produced by this kind of regulatory process have appeared to be little more
than a bribe to buy industry acquiescence in energy sector changes or, worse yet, a
bailout that comes at the cost of consumers. If the history of energy law teaches anything,
however, it is that transitions and change ought to be expected in the energy sector. It
follows that regulatory approaches that force both regulators and investors to consider
stranded cost issues in making current investment decisions, rather than only leaving
them for the future, are worth consideration. Here we canvass just a few examples to
show that energy regulators are already considering this as a way of encouraging new
investments associated with grid decarbonization
One way to encourage such investments to build expensive new infrastructure
projects, especially where there is uncertainty about the future, is to accelerate recovery
for construction costs to the front end, when construction is actually occurring—rather
than requiring infrastructure to be actually built and operating before recovery is
permitted.162 Several jurisdictions permit this approach, which is being used most notably
for the only new nuclear reactors under construction.163 This approach incentivizes
investors to move forward with significant capital undertakings even against the
backdrop of uncertainty by lessening any concern that if regulatory treatment of a project
changes mid-construction, they will not have to repeat history’s nuclear cancelation
episode. On the other hand, this approach shifts some of the burden of this uncertainty to
See supra Part I.B.2.
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customers. Their interests are protected only minimally: they have the predictability of
CWIP being spread over a set time period, and (using Georgia as an example) they have
at least some oversight through the regulatory process, which requires periodic reports by
the utility.164 But construction disputes, delays, and increased costs can remain an issue.165
Cost recovery can also be apportioned to in-service assets as they come online,
enabling investors to earn a return even for projects that are not yet fully complete. For
example, Mississippi Power’s Kemper County Energy Facility is an integrated
gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plant that will be accompanied by carbon capture
technology.166 It is designed to use lignite coal and will be the first plant to employ these
technologies at this scale (its capacity is 582 MW). It is not yet fully online, but the
state’s PUC has approved cost recovery for the parts of the plant that are already in
service and generating electricity. The Kemper facility has also been plagued by
construction delays and increased costs,167 but these have been allocated somewhat
between investors and customers. There is a cap on the costs to customers associated with
the power plant portion of the project,168 but uncapped costs are those associated with the
lignite mine, CO2 pipeline, and “improvements to design.”169 Mississippi Power’s parent
company reports it has taken a $2.5 billion write down.170
At the federal level, the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS)
permits certain renewable energy projects to recover their investments through
depreciation deductions.171 To qualify for the 50% first-year bonus depreciation, these
projects must be in service by January 1, 2018.172 Some states are also allowing for an
excise tax on energy sales to finance a trust fund to jump start renewable investments173
or have consider guaranteed cost recovery for renewable projects, to avoid the used and
useful uncertainty that plagued nuclear plants.174
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These examples show just a few ways that regulators can address uncertainty by
providing investors some compensation for risk early on—whether during construction or
early in an asset’s life—so that the project’s full lifetime need not pass before investors
fully receive compensation for the risks they take on in their investments. For those
capital-intensive projects involving first-mover technologies, or projects facing high
levels of uncertainty, such arrangements can help alleviate investor reluctance. They
come at some cost initially, but by reducing investor uncertainty, they have promise of
reducing the overall regulatory cost of capital for projects in comparison to only allowing
for stranded cost recovery decades into the future. Either customers or taxpayers will
bear these stranded costs, however, so it remains crucial for a regulatory process that
carefully assesses the need for the project and the overall benefits and burdens to ensure
that the investments are worthwhile. By placing all of these decisions at the front end of
a regulatory examination of the value of energy infrastructure, such a temporal shift
would better allow regulators to look at how the cost of capital for each energy resource
fits into a more general assessment of the cost of capital for the firm and for the energy
system more generally as we transition toward grid decarbonization.
One concern with these methods of temporal risk shifting is that, to the extent that
they focus solely on the present value of the investor or firm’s financial costs, they treat
the non-investor attributes of all energy resources the same. For example, basing early
stranded cost recovery purely on compensating market risk treats the environmental and
reliability attributes of every energy resource equally, even if these are not valued by
investors because of the lack of any current pricing mechanism that produces a revenue
stream. As an illustration, new natural gas plants are often touted as providing a “bridge”
to the low carbon energy system, while a new nuclear plant may provide a longer-term
resource for decarbonization.175 Even if the financial risks associated with each project
were otherwise similar, providing similar risk compensation to incentivize investments in
both resources would lead to overinvestment in gas plants and contribute to carbon lockin by delaying their retirement in the future, when lower carbon alternatives can be
deployed. In other words, unless other public values are considered in setting these
incentives, early stranded cost compensation based entirely on reducing financial risks to
investors could readily suffer from the same narrow-mindedness as past stranded cost
compensation, effectively leaving stranded public values that are central to the transition
to decarbonization.
Regulators in the past have failed to address stranded benefits and broader values
beyond investor protection, in part because an ex post stranded cost compensation
regulatory process rewards firms that ignore or withhold disclosing them. In the past,
firms seeking ex post compensation did not have incentives to claim future benefits that
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might offset these costs until the stranded cost compensation is resolved.176 By contrast,
addressing stranded costs at the front end would force all firms offering energy resources
to be transparent about both the costs and benefits associated with those resources. To
combat concerns about certain energy values or attributes not being priced in energy
markets–for example, absent a carbon price, low-carbon energy resources may fail to
attract investors in the first place--legislatures or regulators could address environmental
attributes in approaching incentives designed to attract investors to new projects.
Alternatively, regulators could condition early recovery and other approvals on sunset
provisions.177 For example, a legislature concerned about the need to ultimately shift
away from natural gas might set schedules tapering the availability of cost recovery over
time.178 Plants’ licenses could also include firm expiration dates, creating a presumption
of closure rather than renewal.179
Shifting compensation for these kinds of risks to the front-end of an asset’s may,
of course, increase the firm’s cost of capital for some new energy projects. Inevitably,
this will come at some cost to consumers, but no one claims that the transition to
decarbonization will be cheap. A higher return on investment will be essential to
attracting new investors to low carbon infrastructure such as next-generation nuclear
power plants, large-scale renewable plants, and expensive new transmission lines to
facilitate broader regional deployment of renewable energy. In addition, although the
cost of capital for some investments may go up when initial investments are being
considered, it is not clear that the firm’s overall cost of capital (or what is known as the
regulatory cost of capital) will follow suit, as regulators decades into the future will not
face the same pressures of wasteful lobbying by incumbent firms to provide for back end
stranded cost recovery.180 And even if the cost of capital for some firms were to increase,
applying these kinds of principles to all investment compensation decisions would work
to reduce the system-wide (trans-firm) cost of capital related to decarbonized energy
infrastructure.
Equally important, providing incentives to attract investors to new decarbonized
energy investments cannot, on its own, overcome lock-in where existing carbon-intensive
energy resources remain in operation, facing lower marginal operational costs. Raising
the return on investment to address uncertainty for new resources would attract new
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investment dollars, but this could backfire if, once new infrastructure goes online, the
marginal costs of deploying low-carbon resources do not compare favorably to carbonintensive resources built decades ago.181
To avoid carbon lock-in it is thus just as imperative for regulators to address
stranded costs for existing energy resources, such as the examples involving older nuclear
and coal plants that we have highlighted in Part II, in a similar manner. For example,
regulators providing stranded cost compensation for existing resources should not only be
attentive to protecting a firm’s investors to ensure that financial risks are sufficiently
compensated, but they must also be attentive to the reliability and environmental
attributes of energy resources. This might, for example, lead regulators to approach
stranded investments for some existing coal plants differently from some existing nuclear
plants, or for treating existing gas pipelines differently across geographic areas, based on
the need for capacity to support decarbonized energy infrastructure in different regions.
If incentives for new energy resources compensate investors for risks in a manner that
contemplates values such as reliability and environmental attributes, so too should
compensation for risks associated with older resources. A failure to treat risk
compensation for new and existing resources in a similar manner regarding these values
in stranded cost compensation could distort the cost of capital to favor existing resources,
resulting in the same kind of wasteful delay that characterized grandfathering of existing
power plants under the Clean Air Act.182
2. Reconciling (Some) Stranded Cost Recovery With
Competitive Markets
In most of the examples discussed above, cost recovery through ratemaking is the
norm (as it remains in most states), and regulators can creatively permit investors to
receive early compensation for risks to avoid future stranded cost issues. But, to raise an
issue that has puzzled energy lawyers at least since FERC’s Order 888, what regulatory
approaches are available in competitive interstate energy markets? We believe that
overcoming stranded cost myopia with the transition towards decarbonized energy
infrastructure will require energy law to resolve some of these issues, and offer here a
few thoughts on steps toward that goal.
Consider again the current issue of marginal merchant nuclear power plants,
which are at risk of early closure notwithstanding their reliability and climate benefits.
As suggested above, this particular stranded cost issue is driven by an imperfect
market,183 and there are good reasons to treat these resources differently than fossil-fueled
plants because of their comparative reliability and environmental benefits. The question
that remains, however, is whether regulators can endorse compensating investor risks for
certain forms of power generation against the backdrop of competitive interstate energy
181
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markets, or whether federal competition policy preempts regulators from taking such an
approach.184
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing185
likely places some constraints on stranded cost recovery, at least for issues arising from
flaws in the wholesale markets. In Hughes, the Court invalidated a Maryland scheme that
provided incentives for constructing new natural gas plants.186 Perceiving the wholesale
capacity market to be insufficient to incentivize new construction within its borders,
Maryland enacted a scheme whereby the power plant owners would be compensated with
a fixed revenue stream for capacity that cleared the relevant market.187 In other words, the
compensation was designed to provide more revenue for the plants than what they would
receive on the capacity market..188 Maryland is one of thirteen states that have authorized
their utilities to operate in PJM – a regional transmission organization that operates the
largest organized wholesale power market in the United States. Under the Federal Power
Act (FPA), FERC has “approved the PJM capacity auction as the sole rate setting
mechanism for sale of capacity to PJM, and has deemed the clearing price per se just and
reasonable.”189 Because Maryland’s auction for new in-state generation interfered with
FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction over interstate wholesale sales of energy under the FPA,
the Court upheld a lower court determination that the Maryland scheme is preempted
under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.190
The Court left observors questioning how far beyond its facts Hughes might
extend.191 Although it expressly emphasized the narrowness of its holding,192 the Court
suggested that states may not tether revenues to wholesale market participation or
condition payments on capacity clearing the relevant auction.193 At the same time, the
Court left open “the permissibility of various other measures States might employ to
encourage development of new or clean generation, including tax incentives, land grants,
direct subsidies, construction of state-owned generation facilities, or re-regulation of the
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energy sector.”194 The concepts of “tethering,” “conditioning,” and “re-regulation” all
suggest limits on the spectrum of state options in moving toward decarbonization, but the
contours of those limits are unclear.
Hughes appears to constrain the ability of state regulators to adopt investment
incentives to compensate investors for their risk (including stranded cost recovery) if
these target federal wholesale power market prices. After all, these kinds of incentives or
subsidies would seem to be fundamentally at odds with federal policies favoring
competitive power markets, especially to the extent that they invite states to give
incumbent firms favorable treatment over out-of-state sources of energy or otherwise
distorting price signals in interstate markets. Indeed, FERC’s initial response to the
decision indicates some hostility towards stranded cost recovery for legacy coal or
nuclear plants that are no longer competitive in regional wholesale power markets
operating under similar rules as in Maryland.195
In traditionally regulated states like Georgia and South Carolina, however,
forward-looking regulatory initiatives for new clean energy construction do not seem
problematic. These states are not within competitive wholesale markets like PJM, nor
have they restructured at the retail level.196 Unlike Maryland, therefore, these states have
retained their full authority to decide what values to compensate. Although wholesale
costs must be carried forward into state ratemaking proceedings,197 states retain authority
to set the utility’s return on investment. Moreover, the wholesale costs in these states are
not derived from comptetitive auctions, but rather from bilateral contracts.198 Providing
compensation for the carrying costs of construction, therefore, do not “second-guess” or
“disregard[] an interstate wholesale rate FERC has deemed just and reasonable….”199
Thus, in contrast to the regional capacity market that FERC had approved for PJM, in
many other parts of the country retail reliability (and the need for new power supply
capacity) remains within the wheelhouse of state regulators and is not priced in the
interstate wholesale market.200
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Still, two-thirds of electricity use in the United States takes place within the
organized competitive markets. And absent any effective market price on carbon (such as
a national carbon tax), regional initiatives (including PJM’s capacity market) fail entirely
to price the carbon attributes of various sources of energy.201 As Justice Ginsburg wrote
for the Hughes majority, “We reject Maryland’s program only because it disregards an
interstate wholesale rate required by FERC.”202 Although somewhat unclear, the majority
seems to leave open state flexibility to adopt power supply incentives and subsidies that
advance other values, beyond what is reflected in FERC-approved market prices.203
Thus, regulatory measures that states utilitize to promote clean power generation,
especially those based on the carbon attributes of different energy resources, ought to be
able to coexist with FERC’s regulation of wholesale power markets.
Hughes therefore leaves states considerable space to endorse important regulatory
values in the transition to a decarbonized grid where these values are not priced in the
wholesale competitive power market regulated by FERC. In addressing stranded cost
compensation for the risks associated with energy infrastructure, state regulators should
be encouraged to approach new infrastructure with the aim of advancing values such as
low carbon energy. Of course, as Hughes reminds us, such efforts cannot be motivated
by or target a FERC-approved exclusive scheme for pricing wholesale power sales, such
as the capacity market operated by PJM. However, to the extent that stranded cost
recovery is aimed at social values that are not presently valued in competitive market
prices as approved by FERC, such as retail reliability or carbon impacts of various energy
resources, it is not inconsistent with Hughes’ preemption analysis for states to provide
incentives or subsidies to compensate these energy resources differently.
In a new experiment that will test this assertion and the limits of Hughes, the N.Y.
Public Service Commission (NYPSC) has adopted a Clean Energy Standard that will
among other things compensate upstate merchant nuclear power plants for the social cost
of carbon that their electricity generation avoids.204 Under the Zero Emission Credit
approach applicable to these plants, the nuclear energy companies operating the relevant
plants will receive payments equivalent to the social cost of carbon, netting out revenues
from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), for the first two-year period of the
Credit.205 This approach seems to fall on the “safe” side of Hughes, because it makes no
reference to the wholesale markets and prices an attribute not considered on those
markets. In later years, however, there will also be a price adjustment for wholesale
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energy and capacity market revenues.206 Although the NYPSC was careful to note that it
was not setting a price floor for nuclear power,207 the fact that later compensation directly
accounts for wholesale market revenues is at least worrisome under Hughes.208
Despite the uncertainties created by Hughes, we are optimistic about the general
viability of stranded cost approaches in furtherance of grid decarbonization. That
decarbonization is directed at a value not incorporated into the wholesale markets means
states ought to be able to craft a variety of approaches without running afoul of Hughes.
To the extent that federal involvement is necessary to address some stranded cost issues,
we are encouraged that FERC has experience with such policies just as the states do.
CONCLUSION
Stranded cost recovery for investor risk has played a central role with energy
industry transformation, often helping to grease the wheels of transition. However, as
past experiments with stranded cost recovery show, it also has suffered from a myopia
that has delayed some desirable industry transitions and left stranded important values
that firms and energy markets fail to price. The impending transition to a decarbonizated
grid cannot ignore these timing and stranded value issues and thus presents a unique
opportunity to improve energy law’s approach to stranded cost compensation. As in the
past, stranded cost compensation will prove important (and we believe essential) to the
next energy transition, but it can and should be approached in a manner that overcomes
decarbonization’s obstacles, reassures investors in new infrastructure without distorting
price signals, and recognizes important energy resource attributes that markets fail to
price.
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